Excerpts from a discussion thread from sci.space.policy on
Regulation & Certification of Suborbital Spacecraft
September 2003

Mitchell Burnside Clapp of Pioneer Rocketplane opened this discussion (see google archive) in sci.space.policy on the issue of whether suborbital vehicles should fall under the regulatory regimes of the FAA's AST (Commercial Space Transportation) or the FAA's AVR (Aviation Regulation and Certification) sections.

The debate over AST vs. AVR is fundamentally a cultural one. It's for this reason that I'm increasingly convinced as the years go by that "aerospace" is an oxymoron.

I am firmly of the opinion that shopping around for the most convenient set of rules is a recipe for investment-dampening confusion. I also think that there's a lot of good on both sides of the argument about who regulates what. But any kid who doesn't like the answer he gets from Mom and goes to ask Dad will be in a world of pain when the two compare notes.

Ultimately, I think, the problem is a definitional one. "What is a space transport?" Anything that flies on a suborbital trajectory falls into AST's field and that means that every time I take a jump shot shooting hoops at the Y, I'm breaking the law. Heck, I don't think there's a black letter law definition of "space."

For me, the bright-line test is this: If it is under the sole control of a pilot, physically present aboard the vehicle, who is able to take corrective action at all phases of flight if something breaks, then it is an aircraft, regardless of whether the lift comes from aerodynamic forces, propulsive forces, inertial forces, buoyant forces, or supernatural forces. I think the same is true of control and it's not consequently helpful to draw a distinction between "needs reaction control" and "needs aerodynamic control." All such vehicles should be certificated by AVR, in a category appropriate to their design. I think Jeff Greason and I probably disagree on this point, so talking about it in here might be helpful.

(Let me stress, by the way, that control is not used here to mean "real time control loop closure", or hand-flying. Some designs just don't permit that. It does, however, mean that there ought to be actions the pilot can take at every instant of the trajectory to assure vehicle and public safety. Systems that contain a person with a stick that isn't hooked up to anything don't count. Systems that have unabortable flight phases where the crew's only recourse is to make their peace with their Maker don't count. An occupant is not a pilot).

If the jettison of stages is contemplated, then it becomes an AST responsibility. Calculating things like expected casualties and so on becomes an appropriate thing to do in those circumstances. I think this is true for systems like the ones we're working on at Pioneer Rocketplane that imagine very high-speed over-water release of upper stages. There's no chance such a stage could survive intact to the ground, and there's precedent for "no range safety" package for Pegasus Stage III, which releases at a similar flight condition to what we imaging, but I think we are obliged to prove that to a competent regulator, and that's AST.

Remotely operated vehicles, and I'm thinking in particular of Kistler here, have an interesting problem under these sets of rules. Aviators necessarily become a little apprehensive at the "who's flying this thing?" concerns of remotely operated vehicles. It isn't common to see vehicles without occupants in normal airspace whatever type of vehicle they are, and in this case I think you're essentially tackling the UAV problem. That means that the fidelity and security of your communications link is a safety of flight item. That in turn means that if it fails you are flying an unpiloted, possibly internally guided, space vehicle, and that means that you are back in AST's area of responsibility. Again, if the system has an architecture choice that could lead to an AST-like vehicle configuration, then it's reasonable to expect them to sign off on what you're doing.

Finally, I understand that advocating this approach does raise the burden on "space transport" developers. There are more rules to comply with in AVR, and the only real benefit here is that those rules are not murky; they're quite clear. Let's recognize that when the FAA certificates an aircraft, what it's doing is blessing the manufacturing process. If manufacture and sale of vehicles is not contemplated it would be nice to see something worked out where limited operation of such vehicles, for revenue, could be performed. Exceptions to the no-revenue provisions for certain types of experimental aircraft flights exist now, so there is some recognition that if, for example, you want a gyroplane endorsement on your pilot's license, the odds are that you will be paying for training in an experimental aircraft.

Aviation is an amazingly safe way to travel, and a big part of the reason for it is rigorous and thorough review by the FAA. We owe our customers the same regard for their safety and I think are obliged to set the bar for regulation and certification of our vehicle as high as we can tolerate.

Dan DeLong of XCOR Aerospace gave this response:

> The debate over AST vs. AVR is fundamentally a
> cultural one.

Agree. AST's culture regulates commercial spaceflight. AVR's culture guarantees similarity between serial numbers of production aircraft. AVR assumes a non-knowledgeable passenger just wanting to travel to a destination. New designs within this world are evolutionary, small changews to proven designs.

> Ultimately, I think, the problem is a definitional one. "What is a
> space transport?" Anything that flies on a suborbital trajectory falls
> into AST's field and that means that every time I take a jump shot
> shooting hoops at the Y, I'm breaking the law. Heck, I don't think
> there's a black letter law definition of "space."

No. AST's definition requires rocket propulsion and thrust greater than lift; and there is a minumum size exclusion.

> For me, the bright-line test is this: If it is under the sole control
> of a pilot, physically present aboard the vehicle, who is able to take
> corrective action at all phases of flight if something breaks, then it
> is an aircraft, regardless of whether the lift comes from aerodynamic
> forces, propulsive forces, inertial forces, buoyant forces, or
> supernatural forces.

Only aerodynamic forces create lift. AVR deals with this.

>I think the same is true of control and it's not
> consequently helpful to draw a distinction between "needs reaction
> control" and "needs aerodynamic control." All such vehicles should
> be certificated by AVR, in a category appropriate to their design.

So far, after 10 years of work, Zero-G has not convinced AVR to certify a standard airliner to fly weightless parabolas. That's a certification FAR simpler than a whole new vehicle. I leave it to the reader to extrapolate that curve.

> think Jeff Greason and I probably disagree on this point, so talking
> about it in here might be helpful.

Jeff is currently on his way to Wash DC for yet another formal meeting with FAA and Congress on exactly this subject, so you're stuck with me. :) FAA has regular meetings where you can air your requests. Jeff Greason has been doing this for the past four years. Before that Mike Kelly did much of the heavy lifting.

> (Let me stress, by the way, that control is not used here to mean
> "real time control loop closure", or hand-flying. Some designs just
> don't permit that. It does, however, mean that there ought to be
> actions the pilot can take at every instant of the trajectory to
> assure vehicle and public safety. Systems that contain a person
> with a stick that isn't hooked up to anything don't count. Systems
> that have unabortable flight phases where the crew's only recourse
> is to make their peace with their Maker don't count. An occupant
> is not a pilot).

> If the jettison of stages is contemplated, then it becomes an AST
> responsibility.

So just add a RATO. (Not trying to be mean or obtuse, Mitch, just pointing out that the definition has loopholes.)

>Calculating things like expected casualties and so on
> becomes an appropriate thing to do in those circumstances. I think
> this is true for systems like the ones we're working on at Pioneer
> Rocketplane that imagine very high-speed over-water release of upper
> stages. There's no chance such a stage could survive intact to the
> ground, and there's precedent for "no range safety" package for
> Pegasus Stage III, which releases at a similar flight condition to
> what we imaging, but I think we are obliged to prove that to a
> competent regulator, and that's AST.

I Agree

> Finally, I understand that advocating this approach does raise the
> burden on "space transport" developers.

Absolutely, I think that's the understatement of the century. What it will do is take a $20 million program with technical, management, and market risk, and turn it into a multi-hundred million dollar program with added regulatory risk. It's a HUGE burden, Mitch, and one we can't live with. And all that money adds no value because we (the industry) need to fly as safely as possible to stay in business, make the insurance payments, and successfully defend ourselves in court.

>There are more rules to comply
> with in AVR, and the only real benefit here is that those rules are
> not murky; they're quite clear.

Those rules may be quite clear for existing airplanes, but they don't exist for space transport. A few of the many examples are: AVR has no rules for reentry TPS designs or margins. AVR has no rules for the materials of construction we are likely to evolve. AVR has no rules for how to do supersonic flight, other than they prohibit it. If AVR can hold up certification of the Beech Starship because the stall warning indicator was not appropriate for a canard configured airplane, just imagine what they would do for a hypersonic, low Q yaw damper.

> Let's recognize that when the FAA
> certificates an aircraft, what it's doing is blessing the
> manufacturing process. If manufacture and sale of vehicles is not
> contemplated it would be nice to see something worked out where
> limited operation of such vehicles, for revenue, could be performed.

Within AST, that's handled by testing and demonstration. Nothing to work out.

> Exceptions to the no-revenue provisions for certain types of
> experimental aircraft flights exist now,

Mostly, these are violations of the rules, not exceptions.

>so there is some recognition
> that if, for example, you want a gyroplane endorsement on your pilot's
> license, the odds are that you will be paying for training in an
> experimental aircraft.

When you do this, you are breaking the rules. Not always, but often. Some operators have exceptions, given on a case-by-case basis. You're not likely to get an investor's due diligence blessing based on "They're breaking the rules, so we will too", or maybe get them changed.

> Aviation is an amazingly safe way to travel, and a big part of the
> reason for it is rigorous and thorough review by the FAA.

FAA doesn't know how to do a "thorough and rigouous review" of a launch vehicle any more than NASA does. And NASA's annual budget is three orders of magnitude higher than any entrepeneurial company is going to raise. Maybe space flight will become safe too, after several generations of build and test. Maybe by then, FAA will know how to do a thorough and rigorous review. In the meantime, AST has a good formula for letting the nascent industry develop.

>We owe our customers the same regard for their safety

It's not going to happen, Mitch. Nobody is that smart. If your intent is to initially get into the "common carrier" business selling point-to-point rides to a destination, you have to provide that level of safety. I repeat, that's going to be several vehicle generations in the future. Maybe. And maybe not. It may turn out that high energy, high altitude, highly variable Q and IAS flight really is more dangerous. In which case, by your statement, we should not fly at all.

In the meantime, we can fly "Adventure Travelers" who go through a rigorous "space camp" getting trained on ejection seat procedures, pressure suit procedures, etc. When your customer gets out of this, he will understand the risk is more comparable to skydiving or mountain climbing.

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